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Introduction
Recurrent terrorist attacks in Nigeria in the last 5 
years have generated varied interpersonal and group 
reactions from the Nigerian public. Many of these 
responses, displayed in the rapidly growing online 
forums and digital communities, are supported by 
the Internet. By their nature, online forums and con-
versations reflect citizens’ civic engagement and 
political participation, which according to Tsaliki 
(2002), form the ‘newly emerged public spaces that 
contribute to the enhancement of public deliberation’ 
and reflect the extent to which ordinary citizens con-
tribute to the political process through public debate 
online (p. 95). Online groups exhibit a wide range of 
characteristics and also serve a variety of purposes, 
ranging from small groups engaged in specific topics 
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to wider and more complex online communities 
linked by similar interest simultaneously engaged in 
network exchanges. This community of interactants 
may be mobilised by political interests or the urge to 
advance a social cause or bring together dispersed 
members of professional, social or ethnic groups 
(Wilson & Peterson, 2002). Thus, online forums and 
conversations implement ‘a high level of interactive 
communication, high degree of search for informa-
tion, diversity of opinions and publics and a moder-
ate degree of substantiated argumentation’ (Tsaliki, 
2002, p. 95). Members of the Nigerian publics, some 
of whom are also members of online communities 
and forums, are actively engaged in online conversa-
tions on Nigeria’s fragile security situation and how 
the terrorist attacks affect them.
Terrorist attacks in Nigeria
According to Dowd (2013), Nigeria possesses the 
highest number of documented cases of violence 
involving Muslim-affiliated militias in Africa 
between 1997 and 2012. Boko Haram (BH), an 
Islamist militant group, claims responsibility for 
most of the terrorist attacks in Nigeria. Between 
2009 and 2012, the group was said to have carried 
out 552 attacks with 1932 fatalities in Nigeria and 
was said to be responsible for 2.4% of more than 
23,000 terrorist attacks worldwide. The group advo-
cates an Independent Islamic state of Northern 
Nigeria and full implementation of Sharia laws 
administered by Sharia Courts. The group is also 
asking for an unconditional release of their members 
in police custody. BH claims to rid the northern 
states of non-Muslims and Muslim governors who 
are accused of compromising Islamic teachings (see 
Chiluwa & Adetunji, 2013).
BH began its armed resistance in June 2009. It 
launched several attacks on some designated targets 
including a customs office, a number of churches, 
police headquarters and two police stations, a 
primary school, a prison and a state employment 
bureau in various cities (see START Report, May 
2014). These attacks, according to the group, were 
aimed at fighting corruption and Islamising the 
entire northern states. Some liberal Muslims who 
belong to the popular Sufism (i.e. the mystical 
brotherhood), accused of compromising the Islamic 
codes of conduct, have also been assassinated. The 
group has formally confirmed its link with al-Qaeda 
in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and the Somalia-
based Al Shabaab and operates also in Mali and 
probably Somalia. (see Blair, 2012; Olagunju, 2012). 
They have also pledged allegiance to the Islamic 
State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), promising to ‘hear and 
obey in times of difficulty and prosperity’ (BBC, 7 
March 2015); and they were readily accepted by the 
Islamic state (IS). According to Jim Muir (a BBC 
correspondent in Beirut), this makes BH look like a 
global franchise. The terrorist group aims to estab-
lish a ‘caliphate’ similar to that being pursued by IS 
in Syria that would incorporate Northern Nigeria, 
Chad, Cameroon and Benin republic under a single 
political and religious leader governed by Sharia 
laws. This is not surprising because BH’s ideology 
and operations are similar to those of IS. Recently, 
in pursuit of their agenda, BH carried out attacks in 
Cameroon and Chad killing 41 people and injuring 
many others.
Attacks attributed to BH became more frequent in 
2011 at Maiduguri (Borno state), Damaturu (Yoba 
state) and Jos (Plateau state) of Nigeria. A series of 
bombings by the sect in the northeast before and 
after the general elections of April 2011 left many 
people dead. For instance, on 16 June, the group 
claimed responsibility for the bombing of the police 
force headquarters in Abuja. The attack was said to 
be the first suicide bombing in Nigeria (Chiluwa & 
Adetunji, 2013). Over 400 people were killed in the 
various terrorist attacks in 2011 (Chiluwa & 
Adetunji, 2013). More attacks and the resultant 
deaths in 2012 were to exceed the total fatalities 
recorded in 2010 and 2011 as BH continued their 
acts of terror and violence against Christians, some 
groups of Muslims and other categories of Nigerians. 
In the first 10 months of 2012, more than 900 people 
died in several attacks; armed assaults, with petrol 
bombs, guns and improvised explosives, were 
orchestrated (Agbiboa, 2013). From the early part of 
2012, the group began targeting telecommunication 
infrastructure, which they believed aided security 
agencies in Adamawa state.
Following the series of attacks that destroyed 
government buildings and led to the killing of 
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officials and civilians in northern states, the Nigeria 
government, in May 2013, declared a state of emer-
gency in Adamawa, Borno and Yobe states, where 
the attacks have been concentrated, and ordered 
more troops to be deployed there (see BBC News, 15 
May 2013). However, despite the state of emergency, 
BH continued their attacks. On 8 July 2013, the 
group attacked a boarding school at Mamudo in 
Yobe state, killing over 30 students and a teacher 
when their dormitory was set on fire (Amnesty 
International, 8 July 2013). In a similar attack, the 
sect murdered over 40 students at a college of agri-
culture at Gubja in Yobe state in the same month (see 
Chiluwa & Ifukor, 2015).
In 2014, the sect continued bombings and gun 
attacks in various villages in Borno and Kano states, 
killing several people and displacing thousands of 
villagers. On 19 January 2014, for instance, some 
members of BH attacked Alau Ngawo Fate village in 
Jere Local Government Area, killing 18 people 
(Vanguard, 21 January 2014). They also invaded the 
Kawuri District of Konduga Local Government Area 
of Borno State on Sunday, 26 January and set over 
300 residential houses ablaze, killing more than 50 
people including a soldier and some policemen and 
over 4000 residents were displaced (Vanguard, 27 
January 2014). On February 2014, the sect again 
attacked a Federal Government secondary school at 
Buni Yadi in Yobe state and murdered 59 students 
while they were asleep in their dormitories (Premium 
Times, 26 February 2014). On 14 April 2014, BH 
again bombed a bus station at Nyanya in the Nigerian 
federal capital territory, Abuja, killing 75 people and 
injuring over 200. The following day, the sect kid-
napped 276 girls at a government school in Chibok 
(Borno state) and burnt down the school. Forty-three 
of the girls escaped, and as at the time of this 
research, over 200 girls were still missing. According 
to PM News, on 26 February 2014, the Nigerian gov-
ernment had sought international cooperation from 
France and Cameroon in its battle against the Islamist 
militants. But with the growing BH-terrorist activi-
ties, following the kidnap of the Chibok girls, world 
powers led by the United States, Britain and France 
pledged their support for the Nigerian government 
and promised to send intelligence assistance to find 
the missing girls.
Since the new government of Muhammad Buhari 
(a Muslim) was installed on 29 May 2015, BH have 
intensified their violent attacks that have claimed the 
lives of over 450 people. On 12 June, for instance, a 
night raid in six remote villages in Northeastern 
Nigeria resulted in the death of 37 people. BH also 
attacked N’Djamena, the Chad capital, on 16 June, 
killing 24 people and wounding over 100 others. On 
22 June, the armed group also bombed a mosque in 
Maiduguri when two young female suicide bombers 
blew themselves up killing 30 people during the 
Ramadan prayers. In two successive attacks on 1 and 
2 July, suicide bombers attacked other mosques in 
Kukawa village, killing over 200 people; some of the 
victims, among them children and young girls, were 
killed in their homes. On 5 July, a suicide bomber 
also attacked a church in Potiskum (Yobe state) kill-
ing five worshippers and injuring many others; 
moreover, on 6 July, two bomb attacks on the central 
Nigerian city of Jos left at least 44 people dead (see 
AFP news, 3 July 2015: http://news.yahoo.com/
nigerian-leader-condemns-inhuman-barbaric-
boko-haram-attacks-135249565.html; BBC News, 
Africa, 7 July, 2015: http://www.bbc.com/news/world- 
africa-33406537).
The continuous threats and attacks by BH have 
necessitated the establishment of a combined military 
force of Nigeria, Chad, Cameroon, Niger and Benin 
to confront the Jihadists (see Al Jazeera, 11 June 
2015). The United States has also recently deployed 
90 military personnel to Cameroon and promised to 
send surveillance drones to gather intelligence on BH 
to assist in the counter insurgency efforts. The US 
Defence Department also plans to send about 300 US 
troops to Cameroon in a temporary mission against 
the Islamists (see The Wall Street Journal, 14 October 
2015: http://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-to-send-up- 
to-300-troops-drones-to-fight-boko-haram-1444 
857072).
The numerous attacks highlighted above have gen-
erated a huge body of online civil engagements, 
debates and arguments that also reflect the emotional 
involvements of the participants. The focus of this 
study is the investigation of the various negative eval-
uations and representations of BH, Islam and northern 
Nigeria in the Nigerian online communities and the 
danger these pose to national unity. In spite of the 
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huge literature on stance in discourse, the study of 
stance in online forums or conversations in the con-
text of conflict discourse is not common. A study of 
online asynchronous texts and conversations will ena-
ble a careful investigation of a different kind of data 
that show how citizens (as victims, in this context) 
participate in political and cultural arguments and 
interact with and engage one another in online 
exchanges, particularly during crises. It is also capa-
ble of throwing some more light on the features and 
functions of language in communication during crisis 
situations and the relationship between language, 
communication and culture, particularly in the 
Nigerian unique ethno-cultural and religious context.
Nigerian online forums and digital 
publics
The first Nigerian online community began with the 
forwarding of emails by Diaspora Nigerians to one 
another. By 1991, forwarded news items about 
Nigeria obtained from Reuters and AFP were being 
circulated by ‘netizens’ in the United States. Soon 
the first email listserv known as Naijanet was 
formed, comprising a few Nigerian youths living in 
the United States and their friends (Bastian, 1999; 
Ifukor, 2011). According to Bastian (1999, cited in 
Ifukor, 2011), ‘the various activities by Diaspora 
Nigerians via email, listserv and the Usenet news-
group became the pillars for the construction of a 
virtual Nigeria’ (p. 111). According to Ifukor (2011), 
the Nigerian virtual sphere enabled Nigerian online 
participants to exchange news about the sociopoliti-
cal and economic affairs in Nigeria. Many of the 
netizens exhibited some nationalistic sentiments in 
the manner they discussed and argued on issues 
about the homeland. Before long, however, disagree-
ments, debates and differences in opinions led to the 
formation of some new listservs, especially along 
ethnic lines such as Oduduwanet for Yoruba speak-
ers in 1992 and Igbonet for Igbo speakers in 1994. 
Social and political events in Nigeria also led to the 
establishment of more listservs, Usenet newsgroups 
and online forums (Bastian, 1999; Ifukor, 2011; 
Moran, 2000).
At present, several online communities and digi-
tal forums for and about Nigeria have been created. 
These serve as digital publics that enable members 
to respond to sociopolitical and cultural issues that 
affect their lives. According to Internet World Stats 
(2011), Nigeria ranks first in Internet use in Africa 
with about 44 million users, who are mostly young 
people. Facebook and Twitter are the most popular 
with about 71% of the youth within the age bracket 
of 18–34 years engaging in social media communi-
cation. Increase in social media practice has also 
increased the formation of virtual communities, 
most of which express tribal and ethnic identities 
(Heyd, 2014). Sociopolitical and economic interests, 
as well as events in Nigeria, have further helped in 
the establishment of online forums. These forums 
and online communities exhibit cultural products 
and artefacts (Wilson & Peterson, 2002); social 
categories such as race and ethnicity are also 
actively performed and constructed by participants 
in order to gain visibility online (Heyd, 2014). 
Among the most prominent online communities and 
forums are the Nairaland, Nigerian Village Square 
and Naijapals.
Nairaland
Nairaland was founded in 2003 by Seun Osewa (a 
former student of Electrical Engineering at Obafemi 
Awolowo University, Ile-Ife, Nigeria, who later 
abandoned the programme to pursue his interest in 
Web-hosting business). Nairaland was among the 
first three Web forums created by Osewa, which, 
according to the founder, ‘was the only Nigerian 
community that gave a voice to Nigerians at home. 
Most other Nigerian sites were owned and dominated 
by Nigerians in the United States and United 
Kingdom and covered only issues of interest to 
Nigerians abroad’ (see http://www.jarushub.com/
from-fun-to-millions-how-seun-osewa-built-a-multi-
million-dollar-online-venture-with-nairaland/). In an 
interview with CP-Africa, Osewa further explained 
the purpose of the creation of Nairaland, which 
started off as a small Web forum: ‘the topic section of 
the forum, covering topics outside telecommunica-
tion like romance and jokes was becoming more 
vibrant than the Mobile Nigeria forum (one of the 
three Web forums founded at the same time), sug-
gesting the need for a more general-purpose Nigerian 
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forum’ (see http://www.jarushub.com/from-fun-to-
millions-how-seun-osewa-built-a-multi-million-dol-
lar-online-venture-with-nairaland/). Thus, Nairaland 
was born as a general-purpose discussion forum with 
a strong bias towards issues of interest to Nigerians at 
home. Today, the forum has grown to become an 
online community of youths with over 1.4 million 
registered members (i.e. registered accounts), cover-
ing over two million topics. Alexa.com puts the total 
number of Internet users participating on Nairaland 
at 55 million (i.e. about 32% of the Nigerian popula-
tion), making it the largest online community in 
Africa, ahead of other popular Web forums such as 
NaijaHotjobs NigeriaBestforum, Goal.com and 
jobberman.
Describing the scope of the community, Heyd 
(2014) calls Nairaland a meeting place for local 
Nigerians, recent and longstanding migrants and 
outsiders who take an interest in Nigerian culture 
and language practices, comprising a broad range of 
sub forums including those that deal with aspects of 
daily living, science and technology, sports, jobs, 
culture, families, romance, politics and religion 
among others.
The activities of Nigerian participants in the 
Diaspora are significant because of their acknowl-
edged contributions to both Nigeria’s political and 
economic developments. They not only contribute to 
discussions and debates in online forums but also 
contribute to organising and mobilising offline pro-
tests (see Chiluwa, 2015). They have also utilised 
the forum to educate young Nigerians on their civic 
responsibilities and mobilising their family members 
to participate in the electoral process, especially by 
voting (see African Sun Times, 23 March 2015: 
http://africansuntimes.com/2015/03/nigerians-over-
whelmingly-praise-diaspora-nigerians-for-urging-
nigerians-to-call-nigeria-to-get-their-family-mem-
bers-to-vote/). The Diaspora Nigerians have called 
on the Nigeria government to provide them the 
means of exercising their voting rights while abroad. 
The new Nigerian President has, however, explained 
the reasons why this may not be feasible at present 
such as legislation, logistics, financing and confi-
dence in the electoral process (Vanguard, 26 August 
2015: http://www.vanguardngr.com/2015/08/
buhari-why-nigerians-in-diaspora-cant-vote-now/).
Nairaland derives its name from the Nigerian 
currency (i.e. the naira, represented graphically as 
‘N’ with two horizontal lines across it, as shown in 
the official Nairaland logo in Figure 1).
Because of its large membership base, it is dif-
ficult to give an accurate demography of its mem-
bers. However, as highlighted above, Nairaland is 
an online community of mostly Nigerian youths, 
and those in the Diaspora, as well as ‘friends’ of 
Nigeria, mostly below the age of 50 years, who 
have some education, and are the more avid par-
ticipants in social media platforms. Most of them, 
of course, would hold regular employment, espe-
cially those not in political positions (including the 
self-employed, the jobless and university stu-
dents), representing what is often known as the 
‘general public’. It is also important to mention 
here that many of them have their political affilia-
tions. And from the tempo of political arguments 
that often take place in the online community, it is 
obvious that many of the participants have politi-
cal involvements and party loyalty. But it is not 
likely that politicians are members (or active mem-
bers) of Nairaland, Nigerian politicians rather pre-
fer Facebook and Twitter. For instance, the 
immediate past President of Nigeria utilised 
Facebook to extensively seek support and mobilise 
membership for his party and was referred to as 
‘our Facebook President’ (see Chiluwa, 2011). The 
current Nigerian Vice President and Senate 
President are devoted ‘tweeters’ and have used this 
platform as propaganda to raise public expecta-
tions to the government and build a positive image 
for themselves (see Twitter, @profosibajo and @
bukolasaraki).
Figure 1. The Nairaland logo.
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While it is also difficult to give complete and 
accurate demographic information about partici-
pants on Nairaland, some development indicators 
such as education, computer literacy and social 
exposure can clearly show that male members are 
more than their female counterparts and also that 
male members are more active in the forums than the 
female ones. This is due to the cultural imbalance in 
the preference for and opportunities given to men 
than women, especially in the Northern regions of 
Nigeria, where women are not largely encouraged to 
acquire formal education. As we shall explain in 
more detail in the analysis, a greater percentage of 
the members come from southern Nigeria, where the 
rate of education and enlightenment is higher and 
where opportunities given to women are also higher 
irrespective of religion.
Significantly, by the nature of its membership 
profile and interaction, Nairaland appears to have 
broken the strong ethnicity divide that has plagued 
Nigeria’s social integration for a long time. Members 
while debating or interacting on some topics often 
anchored on ethnic and cultural debates tend to for-
get their cultural and ethnic differences. For instance, 
bombings and suicide attacks in mosques and market 
places in Northeastern Nigeria have attracted wide 
condemnation from both Christian and Muslim par-
ticipants on Nairaland. This is not the focus of the 
present study. The article is interested in cases of dis-
criminatory discourse, where ethnic and religious 
sentiments expressed in the Nigerian virtual sphere 
threaten religious and social harmonious relations in 
Nigeria.
Structure and style of online 
conversations
Online forums (or bulletin boards) enable online 
conversations to take place among participants, 
exemplifying a digital public sphere as a discursive 
platform that promotes citizen debates, delibera-
tions, agreement and/or disagreement, as well as col-
lective actions (Cammaerts, 2007). Conversations 
are represented as sequences of posts, or threads, 
where the posts reply to one or more earlier posts. In 
other words, interactions come in the form of writ-
ing, reading and responding to notes or posts as 
participants exchange information about experiences 
or brainstorm solutions to problems (Putman, Ford, 
& Tancock, 2012). However, Dixon (2012) argues 
that while conversations may occur in an online 
forum, much of what happens in most forums are 
hardly conversations because a member asks a ques-
tion and various other members provide an answer 
or respond to a comment. There are little back and 
forth interactive movements among participating 
members; participants simply make their own state-
ments reflecting their opinion and may not even 
have read others’ comments before stating theirs. 
Kim, Jarvenpaa, and Gu (2013) also argue that an 
important feature of conversation, which is absent in 
online forums, is ‘collective elaboration’, that is, 
when a number of questions generate a number of 
responses from interactants. Kim argues that learn-
ing (in educational forums) takes place among 
groups only when responses have high levels of col-
lective elaboration and when participants from other 
networks join in the discussion. Sun et al. (2011) add 
that users are more motivated to take part in online 
discussions by observing other users’ participation. 
Generally, asynchronous online communications do 
not provide participants with mutual interactional 
benefits as it is the case in a real-life offline conver-
sation. Thus, a lot of features of interpersonal inter-
active dynamism are lost in online conversation.
However, Rovai and Jordan (2004) maintain that 
asynchronous online discussions have been observed 
to promote ‘a level of reflective interaction often 
lacking in a face-to-face teacher-centered classroom’ 
(p. 3). Aumayr, Chan, and Hayes (2011) further 
maintain that online forums afford their users a plat-
form for questions to be asked and answered, infor-
mation to be disseminated and public discussions on 
all types of topics to be carried out. And, according 
to Putman, Ford, and Tancock (2012), participants in 
online conversations are free from the constraints of 
time inherent in face-to-face interaction or real-time 
computer-mediated platforms like instant messaging 
or chats. This enables participants to reflect properly 
on questions or responses before sending them. 
Hence, online conversations or discussions meet 
very important criteria for conversation in terms of 
content and message structure. They further contend 
that the ‘threaded nature of forums allows us to 
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follow the conversations, and thus study interesting 
problems. For example, users can be profiled and 
analysed based on their replying behaviour, which is 
extracted from the reply structure of forums’ (p. 26). 
This method was used by Chan et al. (2010) to pro-
file users and group them together into ‘user roles of 
common behaviour’. The roles were then used to 
delimit forums into percentage of users playing par-
ticular roles. Wang, Ye, and Huberman (2012) note 
that there are underlying rules in common for online 
conversations in different social media websites, and 
that empirical researches show that the dynamics of 
conversation threads play a fundamental role in 
opinion spread and formation, word-of-mouth 
effects and collective problem solving (p. 1).
Nairaland as ‘public sphere’
The term ‘public sphere’, credited to Habermas 
(1962/1989), refers to a portion of people’s social 
experience in which they assemble to discuss prob-
lems of society and consequently motivate political 
action. It represents ‘a discursive space in which 
individuals and groups congregate to discuss matters 
of mutual interest and where possible to reach a 
common judgement’ (Hauser, 1998, p. 86). Habermas 
(1962/1989, p. 30) explains the term with reference 
to Greek philosophy by pointing out the difference 
between polis (the public) and oikos (the private): 
the former captures free citizens’ open interactions 
in the area of politics and the latter refers to free per-
sons’ interactions in domestic life. However, given 
that private individuals make up public individuals, 
who participate in political debate, the two spheres 
are inseparable (cf. Calhoun, 1992). Thus, ‘the pub-
lic sphere and the private sphere can be considered 
mutually inclusive, rather than mutually exclusive, 
social realms’ (Susen, 2011, p. 43).
Going by these definitions, participants on 
Nairaland could be said to constitute a public which 
converges to deliberate on Nigerian social and politi-
cal issues. While the sociogeographical and historical 
origin of the term ‘public sphere’ associates it with a 
physical assemblage of people in actual settings, its 
adaptation to the Internet setting of Nairaland pre-
cludes a real individual-physical gathering. The pho-
tos or other choices of self-identification of individual 
participants iconize their physical presence and their 
contributions symbolise their voices.
Furthermore, the online convergence of Nigerians 
on Nairaland to debate issues of national interest 
typifies civic engagement – ‘individual and collec-
tive actions designed to identify and address issues 
of public concern’ (American Psychological 
Association, 2015, not paginated). The encounters 
of the participants live up not only to the individual 
voluntarism dimension of civic engagement but also 
in part to the other dimensions of civic engagement: 
organisational involvement and electoral participa-
tion. In the context of voluntarism, participants 
freely and critically discuss issues with the goal of 
solving a social or political problem. Situated within 
individual voluntarism, Nairaland encounters pro-
pose solutions through generations of consensuses 
on issues debated. Members encourage one another 
to vote in elections, offer their services to the 
National Electoral body (Independent National 
Electoral Commission (NEC)) as volunteers and 
refuse to be engaged by politicians as political 
thugs. And given the social standing and profiles of 
individuals involved in the debates, the Nigerian 
government has had to reckon with a number of the 
proposals. A manifestation of this recognition is evi-
dent in the Nigerian government’s positive responses 
to opinions expressed in the social media. One way 
in which the last Jonathan’s administration 
responded to public opinion on Nairaland, in addi-
tion to commenting on his Facebook and Twitter 
accounts, was to appoint a Special Personal 
Assistant on Social Media, who educated the gov-
ernment on popular feelings and demands of the 
people. Interestingly, the results of the April 2015 
general elections in the country were first published 
on social media and circulated on Nairaland by 
non-partisan and ‘citizen journalists’ before the offi-
cial announcement. This prompted the NEC to warn 
the public against reliance on ‘unofficial results’ on 
social media. But the fact remains that the govern-
ment and political parties became aware that some 
results that were believed to be credible were 
already made public via social media; hence, they 
threaded with caution. This helped to curtail irregu-
larities. Moreover, during the screening of the min-
isterial nominees of the current Nigerian President 
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by the Senate, the opposition raised an allegation on 
one of the nominees on account of reports they got 
from the social media (including Nairaland) about 
her state of origin. The case was investigated by the 
Ethics Committee that examined cases involving 
the nominees. The case was later resolved when rel-
evant documents that authenticated the nominees’ 
state of origin were produced. This shows how 
important the social media and the online communi-
ties are in the political process and governance in 
Nigeria. Interestingly, this shows that the online 
community has a strong link to social and political 
events in the offline community. This was clear dur-
ing the ‘occupy Nigeria’ protests that paralysed 
social and economic activities in Nigerian in 2012; 
the protests were largely organised, mobilised and 
monitored via social media and Nairaland among 
others (see Chiluwa, 2015).
Although Nairaland succeeds in providing a pub-
lic sphere and voice for ‘ordinary’ Nigerians, politi-
cal and social arguments in the community have 
often reflected ethnic and religious sentiments. 
Members have also, at various instances, expressed 
opinions that show that they are non-committal 
when issues associated with civic engagement are 
discussed, which again brings to the fore the frag-
mented nature of online communities. As a matter of 
fact, ethnic and religious arguments sometimes 
threaten the peace in the forums, where members 
introduce issues that are not connected to the topic 
being debated. This has also resulted in several 
forms of verbal abuse and disparagement. In this 
regard, Nairaland fails to provide and support a neu-
tral social media forum for ‘all Nigerians’ as it 
claims. What is clear, however, is that the BH insur-
gency appears to have placed Nigerians on a com-
mon ground as victims and as a community of 
victims (in this case Nairaland), which appears 
united on the surface, especially in their condemna-
tion of the attacks. Moreover, the disunited ‘offline’ 
Nigeria often re-echoes when ethnic and political 
topics are discussed, which had also threatened 
robust civic engagement of the participants in the 
real sense. As this study argues, the BH activities are 
already being attributed to the North, and unfortu-
nately to Muslims as a whole, which, by implication, 
reflects the usual ideological polarisation: Christians 
are good, Muslims are bad; the North is unsafe; the 
south is safe.
Stance and engagement
Stance is a theoretical concept that has been used to 
describe how speakers or writers express their view-
points, opinions, judgements and attitudes about a 
topic being conveyed through lexico-grammatical 
options (see Biber, 2006). This process has also been 
described as evaluation (Bednarek, 2006; Hunston 
& Thompson, 2000), appraisal (Martin, 2000) or 
attitude (Halliday, 1994). Biber and Finnegan (1989) 
define stance as ‘the lexical and grammatical expres-
sion of attitudes, feelings, judgements or commit-
ment concerning the propositional content of a 
message’ (p. 124). These are expressed as epistemic 
and affective stances. Epistemic stance is a ‘socially 
recognised disposition’, while affective stance is a 
‘socially recognised feeling, attitude, mood or 
degree of emotional intensity’ (Ochs, 1990, p. 2). 
Beyond the expression of commitment, opinions and 
judgements, stance is ‘positioning’ the writer and 
enabling them to ‘stamp their personal authority 
onto their arguments or step back and disguise their 
involvement’ (Hyland, 2005, p. 176). According to 
Du Bois (2007), positioning is the act of situating a 
social actor with respect to responsibility for stance 
and for invoking sociocultural value (p. 143).
Engagement is the point where ‘writers acknowl-
edge and connect to others, recognising the presence 
of their readers, pulling them along with their argu-
ment, focusing their attention, acknowledging their 
uncertainties, including them as discourse partici-
pants and guiding them to interpretations’ (Hyland, 
2005, p. 176). According to Hyland, stance and 
engagement overlap being two sides of the same 
coin and contribute to the interpersonal aspect of 
discourse.
This study identifies lexical indices and labels of 
stance that reflect negative valence such as those that 
express anger and hate towards the terrorist group. 
However, the study argues that certain subjective 
and emotional negative representations of BH tend 
to misrepresent reality about the militant group; 
more importantly, they pose the danger of promoting 
ethnic hatred and religious intolerance among the 
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Nigerian ethnic nationalities. The representation of 
Islam in the thread below (from the data) is an 
example:
The world would be a better place without Islam 
because that thing called Islam is a problem anywhere 
in the world. We may pretend and even claim that what 
is happening in the north today is more of political 
issues than religious issues, but i tell you the whole 
thing is about religion. People that refer to Islam as 
religion of peace are either playing with our intelligence 
or they do not know what they are talking … Shekau 
challenged Islamic clerics all over the world to come 
out and prove him wrong if they think what he is doing 
is not in accordance with the instructions of their Allah 
and we have not seen anybody yet. Tell me which 
Muslim has sincerely condemned the activities of Boko 
Haram in Nigeria up till date. (danny301, 4.01 p.m. 
Sept. 9, 2012)
While BH operates in the name of Islam, many 
Muslims claim that their activities do not represent 
the true values of Islamic Faith (see Alexseev, 2001; 
Al Sayyid, 2002). Unfortunately, the BH terrorist 
activities in Nigeria are likely to create a wider gap 
between Christians and Muslims, and since it appears 
that most sect members are Hausa and Fulani, north-
erners are mostly likely to be constantly branded 
‘fanatics’ or ‘violent’. If a reprisal attack occurs from 
Christians in the south, all northerners living in south 
will be attacked; this is has happened before.
Because writers see their readers as active dis-
course participants who are capable of disagreeing 
with their arguments and lines of thought, they 
employ discursive strategies to ‘engage’ them in 
order to persuade and convince them. Hyland (2005) 
offers two reasons why writers employ engagement 
strategies: first, the need to meet the reader’s expec-
tations and include the reader in a kind of discipli-
nary solidarity; second, to rhetorically position the 
reader, thereby pulling the reader into the discourse, 
predicting possible objections and guiding the reader 
to particular interpretations with questions, direc-
tives and references to shared knowledge. Within the 
framework of the appraisal theory, engagement 
accounts for linguistic resources with which the 
authorial voice positions itself with respect to other 
textual voices, including alternative positions in a 
given discourse context (Martin & White, 2005). 
Thus, engagement not only accounts for evaluative 
uses of language by which speakers or writers adopt 
a particular position or stance but also those devices 
by which they interact with potential or real hearers 
or readers such as evidentiality, modality or hedging 
(Arrese & Perucha, 2006). Hyland (2005) proposes 
five ‘main elements of engagement’, which he 
describes as reader pronouns, personal asides, 
appeals to shared knowledge, directives and ques-
tions (p. 182). Four of these elements are relevant 
to the present study namely, (1) reader pronouns, 
(2) appeals to shared knowledge, (3) directives and 
(4) questions. These are described and explained in 
detail in the analysis.
Methodology
The data for this study are obtained from the 
Nairaland corpus (compiled from the Cyber-creole 
project of the University of the Freiburg) comprising 
14 million worlds. The corpus comprises data sam-
ples from online conversations/threads on Nairaland 
from July 2009 to January 2014. Qualitative analysis 
of stance and evaluation is carried out at the level of 
vocabulary, alongside the elements of engagement. 
Some grammatical expressions that reflect negative 
valence and evaluative judgements that are of high 
interest to the study are also analysed. ‘PO’ in the 
samples stands for ‘post’. For constraints of space, 
only few very important samples are reproduced in 
the analyses.
Analysis and findings
The qualitative (critical) discourse analysis of stance 
and evaluation carried out here, based on the 
appraisal framework, examines the possible conse-
quences of the various (affective) ideological repre-
sentations of BH in the forum and how these may 
further endanger religious and ethnic relations in 
Nigeria.
Discursive representations of BH
The constructions of BH in the conversations in 
most cases express negative valence (e.g. anger and 
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hate). In addition to some main lexical items, the 
inclusive pronouns ‘we’ and ‘they’/‘them’ are fre-
quently used to emphasise membership of the 
Nigerian populace often constructed as victims. 
Thus, ‘we’ textually constructs the writer and reader 
as participants with similar understanding and per-
spective; ‘they’/‘them’ refers to the BH as the ‘other’ 
and who in most cases are constructed as ‘evil’ or are 
explicitly referred to as ‘the beast’ as in PO1 below. 
In some of the samples, ‘these people’ also refers to 
BH, and the use of ‘these people’ in context fre-
quently connotes negative evaluation as in PO4 and 
PO5. On the other hand, the Nigerian people are 
referred to as ‘our people’ or rhetorically referred to 
as ‘light’ that cannot co-exist with darkness (‘dark-
ness’ refers to BH). Hence, some of the participants 
recommend ‘death penalty’ for ‘them’ (PO5). This 
representation of BH and Nigeria is quite interesting, 
because judging from the complex ethnic, political 
and religious differences in Nigeria, the participants 
were probably for the first time, beginning to see 
each other as one. The perception of BH as a prob-
lem and the form the BH’s attacks had taken possi-
bly suggest the creation of a sense of nationalism in 
Nigerians. However, some of the instances of ‘they’ 
and ‘them’ in the texts refer to the Nigerian govern-
ment or the armed forces and in many cases has no 
ideological implications. In the samples below, 
words and expressions that are significant in terms 
of their evaluative properties are highlighted.
PO1. But dis beast called Boko haram are they humans 
or devils?
PO2. Now we have an evil about to consume the whole 
country as a result of this. Wouldnt it be better if they 
taught themselves proper lessons, but na naija? The 
best thing for them to do is to just kill each new person 
who claims themselves as the leader. Maybe they want 
to die like the first guy. It’s okay, they said they would 
die if it came down to it. Can’t we just kill all of them 
already? Waste of life!!!
PO3. Dialogue with terrorists is ridiculous in the first 
place
To hell with Boko Haram …
PO4. Jst got a call now. 2bombs exploded inside a 
catholic church in Madalla Niger State a town that 
border Abuja FCT details later. What is wrong with 
these people.
PO5. On Xmas day!!! These people are barbaric and 
deserves nothing but death penalty. Why all these and 
will people go to hell fire if they don’t worship God 
today or conduct today’s service from their home? This 
is just very sad.
Most of the contributions were reactions to 
reports of bombings and threats associated with BH. 
For instance, PO2 above was reacting to one of BH’s 
threats (e.g. ‘we will teach Nigeria a lesson’). PO4 
was also responding to the report of the bombing of 
a Catholic Church at Madalla on the Christmas day 
of 2012. Lexical labels that express negative valence 
towards BH are mostly descriptive words (adjec-
tives), used within nouns phrases, for example, 
‘ruthless bastards’, ‘bloody moronic imbeciles’, 
‘confused retarded hypocrites’, ‘barbaric animals’ 
and so on. Similarly, BH’s activities are explicitly 
described as ‘horror’ or ‘horrendous’ (PO6). Words 
(verbs) that express actions attributed to BH such as 
‘killing’, ‘destroying’ or ‘hate’ are also highly emo-
tional. ‘Killing’ is a keyword in the corpus, which 
occurs 9910 times (0.0678%, see appendix below). 
These emotional negative evaluations are under-
standably due to what is known about the terrorist 
group and their activities; their behaviour is judged 
according to ethical standards of behaviour which 
BH is known to constantly violate. Nouns that refer 
to BH also express negative evaluation, for example, 
referring to them as ‘terrorist’ or ‘fools’; some of the 
nouns and noun phrases are rhetorical devices (e.g. 
metaphor), referring to them as ‘darkness’ (PO7) or 
‘sons of dogs’ (PO9). The implications of these neg-
ative judgements are to construct the image of the 
Nigerian tragedy in order to establish not only the 
attitude of the writers and participants but also to 
negatively influence the public opinion of and 
assumption about BH.
PO6. pls whoeva is within d environ shud pls come out 
and help. D scene here is horrendous, bodies scattered 
everywhere. It luks lyk sumtin from a horror movie
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PO9. njokusboy: Sons of Dogs … I am sure most of 
those canines cannot even spell their name … The only 
thing they are gud at is clutching rifles and charging lyk 
rams …
PO10. Spinless bastárds!! Bloody móronic imbéciles 
wasting innocent lives because their god promised 
them virgins!!
PO12. May God continue to protect his people from 
dis barbaric animals.
The Nairaland forum is structured as a platform 
for conversations, where participants engage in 
actual interactions and not just a sequence of posts 
and responses; thus, participants present proposi-
tions, ask questions and take stance. Thus, engage-
ment resources are characterised as dialogic in the 
sense that they are the means by which the textual 
voice represents itself as acknowledging, engaging 
with, challenging or aligning itself with other utter-
ances (White, 2003). One of the engagement devices 
in the forum is questioning. According to Hyland 
(2005), questions are a strategy that invites engage-
ment and brings the interlocutor to where he or she 
can be led to the writer’s viewpoint. ‘They arouse 
interest and encourage the reader to explore an unre-
solved issue with the writer as an equal, a conversa-
tional partner, sharing his or her curiosity and 
following where the argument leads’ (p. 185). In the 
data for this study, however, most of the interroga-
tives are rhetorical questions which are not intended 
to elicit specific answers but are used to express 
viewpoints, and in this context, they express emo-
tional viewpoints. In PO7 and PO8 below, rhetorical 
questions are asked in order to ‘propose a revolution’ 
in Nigeria, which the writer of PO7 says is ‘now’.
PO7. Why are people so wicked? Why are people so 
heartless? Light and Darkness cannot co-exist!
The time is now!
PO8. Okay, when are we gonna take this fight into our 
own hands? I propose a revolution to completely 
eradicate these rutless bastards spoiling our name, 
killing our people, and destroying our properties.
While the various negative representations of BH 
in the corpus appear factual (e.g. referring to them as 
terrorists – the words ‘terrorists’ and ‘terrorism’ are 
keywords in the corpus occurring 5332 times or 
0.0365% and 4851 times or 0.0332% respectively), 
we argue that some of the negative evaluations are 
misleading about the true character and intentions of 
the group. For instance, referring to them as ‘fools’ 
or as ‘schizophrenic brain dead idiots’ as in PO11 
below is simply an emotional reaction to the bomb-
ings meant to insult the group and not necessarily to 
represent facts.
PO11. Fools that hate westernization yet, they use 
youtube to upload their crimes/claims to genocides. 
They drive western cars. Live in western houses. Use 
western weapons to kill innocent civilians. Confused 
retarded hypocrites!! Preaching against a notion they 
use in their everyday lives. Schizophrenic brain dead 
idiots
The contributor in PO11 denigrates BH with such 
choices as ‘fools’, ‘confused retarded hypocrites’ 
and ‘schizophrenic brain dead idiots’. These choices 
which largely emerged more from the psychological 
context of anger than from a careful, scientific 
thought blatantly condemns the operations of BH. In 
a way, his affective stance relates to his judgement of 
BH’s attacks as insensitive, and therefore, senseless. 
This justifies his choice of disparaging lexemes. 
However, a careful look at the BH group practically 
disproves the applicability of folly or idiocy in the 
real sense. And constructing their identity in this 
light would not be helpful in coming round the crisis. 
In point of fact, the group must be seen as one of the 
most sophisticated armed militants in Africa engaged 
in coordinated attacks never witnessed in the history 
of terrorism in Nigeria. For instance, BH initiated 
suicide bombing in Nigeria, and most of the attacks 
have been highly successful. The former Nigerian 
President Jonathan himself admitted that BH had 
infiltrated the Nigerian government (see Chiluwa 
and Ifukor, 2015). While many of the BH members 
are indeed uneducated almagiris (converts??), their 
membership comprises university lecturers, politi-
cians, lawyers, bankers and so on (Agbiboa, 2013), 
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and they receive support from other members of al-
Qaeda operating in Mali, Somalia and possibly 
Libya. BH is consistently and assiduously pursuing 
their political and religious agenda of creating an IS 
in northern Nigeria (see Agbiboa, 2013; Chiluwa & 
Adetunji, 2013). These are not the activities of 
‘schizophrenic brain dead idiots’ in the real sense. 
They are the actions of a determined group that is 
utilising all their resources to achieve a political rev-
olution, as well as advance the global objectives of 
al-Qaeda in the world.
Constructing religious affiliation
Religion and religious affiliations are a very sensitive 
social factor in the Nigerian society as it has a major 
influence in the Nigerian politics. Nigeria is often 
viewed as the most religious country in the world 
(see Chiluwa, 2008) and constantly pulled to differ-
ent directions by two powerful religions – Islam, pre-
dominantly in the north, and Christianity, dominating 
the south. However, studies have shown that a good 
number of Christians live in the north. While 
Christianity dominates the southeast and ‘south-
south’, the southwest is made up of Christians and 
Muslims (see Salawu, 2010). Overtime, the struggle 
to propagate one religion above the other had resulted 
in major religious conflicts in the country (Chiluwa, 
2008). According to Muhammad (2008), the antago-
nism between Islam and Christianity poses obvious 
threat to the sociopolitical and economic stability of 
the country and nothing suggests that there would not 
be ‘a full-blown religious war’ in the future ‘given 
the trend and character of religious conflicts’ (p. 121). 
It is also important to note that
ethnicity and religious bigotry have become a fulcrum 
of various forms of nationalism ranging from (the) 
assertion of language, cultural autonomy and religious 
superiority to demands for local political autonomy 
and self-determination … These sometimes lead to 
some forms of contextual discrimination of members 
of one ethnic or religious group against another on the 
basis of differentiated systems of socio-cultural 
symbols and religion. (Salawu, 2010, p. 346)
Interestingly, the recurrent violence in Nigeria 
attributed to BH has tended to ‘unite’ Christians and 
Muslims participating in the Nairaland forum as 
they together condemn the activities of the group. 
However, in most of the threads, Christian voices are 
the more prominent, where the inclusive pronoun 
‘we’ refers to Christians and ‘they’ refers to Muslims. 
However, even with the obvious violence perpe-
trated by BH, there is still the struggle to defend the 
virtues of Islam, which Muslim members of the 
forum argue have been contradicted by the activities 
of BH as in PO18. Most of the samples below exem-
plify Christian voices, denouncing and discrediting 
Islam in reaction to the report that ‘BH killed 10 
Christians in Borno State’. One way this is done, is 
by rhetorically extolling Jesus Christ as in PO12, 
indirectly implying that Christianity is by far, better 
than Islam. While rhetorically addressing Jesus in 
PO12, the writer adds, ‘You never asked your disci-
ples to force any one to believe in you and to kill 
anyone who do not believe in You’, obviously allud-
ing to the assumed superiority of the Christian leader 
over that of Islam.
PO12. I love my Jesus!!! A peace maker, a loving son 
of most most High God. You came to this world you 
preach peace, you heal the sick, you raise the dead, You 
make barren women to bear children. You give hope to 
the hopeless. You never preach for violence, You said 
to your disciples go and preach the good news to the 
rich, to the poor, and to the sick, for those who believe 
in you shall find peace in their heart. You never asked 
your disciples to force any one to believe in you and to 
kill any one who do not believe in You. You are the way, 
the truth and the life. In you, i will give my entire life!!! 
Every where He go, He was doing good. He is the price 
of PEACE.
PO12 shows that Islam is generally constructed 
as a religion that promotes violence, and Muslims 
are represented as violent people. Interestingly, in 
order to prove their point, the writer of PO14 (below) 
quotes the exact passages in the Quran where 
Muslims are enjoined to killed non-Muslims. 
Muslims are also associated with occupations that 
are generally regarded in Nigeria as ‘low’ or ‘undig-
nified’ as in PO13. Ironically, some of the online 
participants who live in Europe or America do simi-
lar jobs and even worse; but in the forums, these 
occupations are used as identity markers for 
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Muslims. Moreover, Muslims are constructed as 
ambivalent migrants, who are not happy in the 
Muslim world but find happiness in Western nations. 
They are said to wish to convert the nations where 
they are happy to where they are not. Using the rhe-
torical method of repetition (or parallelism) (e.g. 
Muslims are not happy, they’re not happy in Gaza, 
they’re not happy in Egypt; they’re not happy in 
Libya etc. – PO15), the writer, applying a narrative 
style, further appears to taunt Muslims.
PO13. Is high time we start bombing & killing all dis 
miserable Muslims in de south eastern states … bt dey 
re all miserable gays … shoe makers, tailors etc. We 
are now reaping the fruit of what was sown 9 years ago 
(or thereabout), when sharia law was established in 
Zamfara.
PO14. Quran 9:123 says, o ye who believe! Fight those 
of the unbelievers who are near to you and let them find 
in you hardness … Qur’an:9:5 ‘Fight and kill the 
disbelievers wherever you find them, take them 
captive, harass them, lie in wait and ambush them 
using every stratagem of war’. Qur’an:9:112 ‘The 
Believers fight in Allah’s Cause; they slay and are 
slain, kill and are killed’. Qur’an:9:29 ‘Fight those who 
do not believe until they all surrender, paying the 
protective tax in submission …’
PO15. carujmonella: Muslims are not happy! They’re 
not happy in Gaza. They’re not happy in Egypt, They’re 
not happy in Libya, Morocco, Iran, Iraq, Yemen 
Afghanistan, Syria. In Lebanon they’re not happy. So, 
where are they happy? They’re happy in Australia. 
They’re happy in England, France, Sweden, Norway. 
They’re happy in USA. They’re happy in every country 
that is not Islamic! And who do they blame? Not Islam. 
Not their leadership. Not themselves. They blame the 
countries they are happy in! And they want to change 
them to be like the country they came from, where they 
were so unhappy.
Emotional negative evaluation is further expressed 
in the descriptions of and labels for Muslims such as 
‘miserable Muslims’, ‘shoe makers’, ‘tailors’ and so 
on. As pointed out above, ‘shoe makers’ actually 
refers to cobblers and ‘tailors’ here are the mobile 
freelance tailors, whose jobs are to mend torn clothes. 
In Nigeria, these occupations are looked down upon 
and are usually the works of the local Hausa mal-
lams, who migrated to southern cities like Lagos or 
Port Harcourt. These occupations generally give 
them the identity of social misfits and are used to 
taunt them. Unfortunately, the Christian apologists 
generally associate this with religion and construct 
the identity of Muslims in terms of poverty and social 
degradation. The kind of negative affect expressed in 
the forum towards Muslims is apparently that of hate 
and anger. For instance, the writer of PO13 emotion-
ally recommends the ‘bombing’ and ‘killing’ of 
Muslims living in the southeastern states. 
Unfortunately, the writer and others who least under-
stand the complexity of the BH insurgency view it as 
a religious war between Christians and Muslims with 
many recommending reprisal attacks on Muslims. 
Because social media promotes anonymity, partici-
pants do not often take responsibility for their com-
ments regardless of how radical and unreasonable 
some may sound; participants on Nairaland, in some 
cases (like this one), sometimes say things they 
would not generally say in offline political dis-
courses. Hence, emotional outbursts, criticisms and 
social analysis in the social media and online forums 
are not the same in the offline community.
This brings us to our main argument in this article 
that BH’s activities may be misinterpreted and result 
in a more serious religious intolerance in Nigeria 
because the escalation of violence against Christians 
in the northeast can lead to reprisal attacks and killing 
of innocent Muslims in the south. In February 2006, 
for example, 33 people, mostly Christians, were 
killed and about 30 churches burnt down in the north-
ern cities of Bauchi and Maiduguri when Muslims 
rioted over Prophet Muhammad’s cartoon caricature. 
Voice of America reported that reprisal attacks on 
Muslims living in the southeast of Onitsha claimed 
the lives of about 64 people, mostly Muslims after 5 
days of violence. This is probably the reason why the 
writers of PO16 and PO17 below wondered why 
Christians were still residing in the north or not 
defending themselves. But indeed, Christians have 
been reported as defending themselves. According to 
NewsRescue.com of 17 June 2012, Christian groups 
in anger and frustrations over BH’s bombing of three 
churches leading to the death of 20 Christians in 
Kaduna, rioted and killed about 40 innocent Muslims, 
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who had nothing to do with the terrorist attacks 
(http://newsrescue.com/nigeria-boko-bombs-kill-
13-innocents-in-kaduna-churches-christians-kill-
11-innocent-muslims/#ixzz37pBX16vn). Words that 
reflect negative affect in the samples below such as 
‘silly’ or ‘looking’ idly are used to describe the 
unwelcome supposed attitude of Christians. The 
writers, therefore, advised them to ‘arm and defend 
yourselves’ and ‘be wise’.
PO16. This silly Christians!!! you’re there looking. you 
better arm and defend yourselves una wey dey stay 
village for borno again kai … una go dey slip dey drool 
like say nofin dey happen
PO17. But i still don’t understand why Christians are 
still in the north … And some of them had faith but also 
died in sin, which means HELLFIRE … Be wise xtians.
Thus, tension between Christians and Muslims 
has remained acute in Nigeria, and conflicts of a 
seemingly socioeconomic or political nature have 
often divided people along religious lines. In the 
forum, non-violent Muslims dissociate themselves 
from the activities of BH, and where possible as in 
PO18 below, attempt to give reasons why BH’s 
stance on religion and violent actions cannot repre-
sent the position of all Muslims. Using the engage-
ment strategy of questions, the writer, responding to 
an earlier post, tries to draw the attention of the 
writer or reader to some illogical inclusion of Muslim 
faithfuls who are in the majority with the terrorist 
Muslim minority. Interestingly, the recent frequent 
bombings of mosques in the northeastern Nigeria are 
beginning to given some insights to the true charac-
ter and intentions of BH.
PO18. tmotmo: I agree with you that Boko haram is 
doomed. However, your last 2 sentences are wrong and 
misleading. Boko haram claimed they are killing for 
Allah, but Boko Haram, al Qaeda, alshabab and the 
likes constitutes less than 2% of over 2 billion Muslim 
population of the world. Now tell me how could their 
views be the correct representation of the majority if 
not for your bigotry and stereotyping?
The contributor of PO18, which ends on a typical 
note of disparagement, engages with an orientation 
to the Leechian approbation maxim. At the initial 
stage, he affiliates with the stance of the preceding 
contribution. With the concessional subordinator, 
‘however’, in the second sentence, he disaffiliates by 
argumentation which faults the claim that BH’s kill-
ing operations represent a fulfilment of an Islamic 
tenet. The last sentence however insults adding to 
the pool of expressions on Nairaland with the poten-
tial to stir religious crisis.
Constructing ethnicity and 
identity in the forums
Some studies on ethnicity and identity in the context 
of computer-mediated communication have estab-
lished that virtual communities provide the platform 
for ‘doing ethnicity’ through some racial and linguis-
tic labels by different ethnic identities (Heyd, 2014). 
An online community is also a virtual space where 
the oppressed groups assert their identity, resist dis-
crimination and struggle against ethnic domination 
(Chiluwa, 2012; Poster, 1998). The Nairaland is a 
virtual community that clearly illustrates the strug-
gle for tribal and ethnic self-determination and also 
reflects the view that overarching ethnic conscious-
ness often endangers national consciousness (see 
Mclaine, 2003). With over 400 ethnic groups and 
languages, Nigeria has remained a multi-ethnic 
nation constantly grappling with the problem of eth-
nicity and ethno-religious conflicts. Some ethnic 
groups have also demanded economic and political 
independence as well as social security. This has led 
to the emergence of ethnic militias such as MEND 
(movement for the emancipation of the Niger Delta), 
MASSOB (movement for the actualization of the 
sovereign state of Biafra), OPC (O’dua people’s 
congress), Bakassi Boys and so on (see Chiluwa, 
2011; Salawu, 2010). This separatist feeling, now 
exacerbated by BH’s activities, has increased ethnic 
consciousness. Many of the participants in the forum 
(notably, the Igbo) view the BH’s menace as the last 
call to breakup Nigeria, which to them is long over-
due (Chiluwa & Adetunji, 2013).
Naturally, Nigeria is divided by two rivers (i.e. 
River Niger to the east and River Benue to the north). 
Hence, the constant reference to ‘north’ and ‘south’ 
is borne out of the perceived natural and historical, 
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as well as cultural consciousness of being different. 
Despite the colonial policy that made Nigeria one 
nation, most of the ethnic groups still see themselves 
as different from one another. Also, the fact that the 
south of Nigeria is more developed in terms of uni-
versity education and technological awareness; it is 
believed that the majority of participants on 
Nairaland are south-born youths, living in Nigeria 
and abroad, many of them are Christians. Therefore, 
the kind of ‘ethnic’ consciousness expressed in the 
forum is that of belonging either to the north or south 
rather than orienting to tribal identification because 
even in the south, tribal and ethnic barriers remain 
intractable. In this context, ‘we’ and ‘us’ refer to the 
south, while ‘they’ and ‘them’ refer to the north. For 
example, the inclusive ‘we’ in PO19 and PO20, as 
an engagement strategy, seeks to create that regional 
(southern) feeling in the reader.
PO19. I think we southerners need to listen to the 
wisdom of Wole Soyinka. I keep saying we need to 
cooperate much more than we are doing now; make 
una shine eye or one day de trap go close.
Kech:
PO20. Well if the story is true I would advise every 
southerner in the north to hurry back home. But those 
guys should know that whatever they do would have 
implications, let them come we shall be ready. I can see 
an end to Nigeria.
Incidentally, the ‘wisdom’ of Wole Soyinka (the 
Nigerian 1986 Nobel laureate in literature) referred 
to in PO19 has no direct link with warring against 
the north as implied in the threads. In an interview, 
Soyinka had remarked,
… in all these incidents both government and the 
citizenry had exhibited complacency in the matter of 
extra-judicial killings … I abhor all forms of extra-
judicial killings and there is no evidence of a rigorous 
attempt by government to pursue the killers and 
everyone went to sleep and these again went 
unchallenged. So these are the root causes of Boko 
Haram where language of appeasement has been used 
to encourage it or these things are happening with 
government’s tacit support … (see http://www.
thisdayonline.com/nview.php?id=151635)
Perhaps, the writer is making reference to what 
Soyinka said earlier. Some directive (physical) acts in 
PO19 are used to engage the reader, instructing him 
or her to do something such as ‘make una shine eye’ 
(open your eyes) in readiness to revenge; another 
writer recommends a cognitive act such as ‘be wise’ 
(in PO17) in order for them to defend themselves.
In the construction of the southern Nigerian iden-
tity, the north is constructed as a hindrance to the pro-
gress of Nigeria. Hence, the solution to meddling 
with the north is a breakup. Some of the posts explic-
itly call for this breakup of Nigeria for two reasons: 
first, the north, according to them, is populated by a 
violent people, who are obsessed with the feeling 
having ‘the monopoly of violence’ (PO21). Second, 
they over-rely on the southern Nigerian economy for 
survival. Hence, one of the participants emotionally 
recommends the killing of all the Hausa by the Joint 
Military Task Force (JTF; set up by the Nigerian gov-
ernment to combat BH) (PO22). The writer of PO21 
had earlier recommended making life miserable for 
the northerners living in the southwest, south-south 
and southeast. Notice that ‘we’ indicates positive 
action followed by positive evaluations, while ‘they’ 
or ‘these people’ (referring to the entire northerners) 
are attributed to negative actions, also negatively 
evaluated. For instance, ‘we’ (the southerners) are 
‘priceless asset’, (PO25), while ‘these guys’ (the 
northerners) ‘have refused to go to school’; ‘we’ (the 
southerners) have all the oil, (PO29) and ‘they’ (the 
northerners) are ‘drawing us back’. The north is also 
metaphorically referred to as ‘dead weight’ (PO32).
PO21. Its time Nigeria broke up. Seriously, what 
makes these people think they hold the monopoly over 
violence? We need to make life miserable for their 
brethren in the SW, SS and SE. Maybe they will tell 
their brothers up north to behave.
PO22. JTF pls kill all northerners! They are all one and 
d same! Kill dem all!
PO23. I think it’s time we separate in Nigeria, we are 
not one, honestly.
PO24. But i still want Nigeria to be one!! can’t we just 
be happy living in the same borders? i want peace to 
really come and the north end this sharia nonsense.
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also use the oil to better Nigeria and stop being greedy. 
But i would always choose peace over war, any day, 
anytime.
PO25. No Amaka mba
These guys have refused to go to school. We want 
nation builders. We the southerners are a priceless 
asset, and we are on the threshold of national service 
to our nations building. Nobody can afford to draw 
us back.
The conversations constantly harp on the age-long 
resource control question, which has been the heart 
of the Niger Delta (ND) crisis. There seems always to 
be the feeling of deprivation on the mind of an aver-
age southerner in relation to the north – the fact that 
‘we’ produce the oil and ‘they’ produce nothing; ‘our’ 
oil is used to develop ‘their’ cities. This is the feeling 
that led to the armed resistance of the ND youths. 
‘Oil’ is a keyword in the data, which implies that it is 
both textually and discursively significant, occurring 
9551 times (i.e. 0.0653%). Words and expressions 
that represent the state and actions of the north indi-
cate negative evaluation such as loss, misfortune, 
have nothing, move backward, Sharia nonsense and 
so on. On the other hand, ‘we’ (the south) move the 
nation ‘forward’. Notice the emphatic ‘No Amaka 
mba’ in PO25 reflecting anger. ‘Mba’ is an Igbo word 
for ‘No’ ! The writer of PO24 (Amaka) had sug-
gested living happily together with the north to which 
the response was an emphatic ‘no’ !
PO26. Nigeria break up is imminent: northern states = 
19 including Abuja (please if you are an indigene of 
kogi, kwara, fct please renounce your membership and 
join the south southern states = 18 (including Jos)
PO27. Then the south can take its oil and be happy!!!!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! YES!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
If that ever does come about …
PO28. i will see another civil war coming.
Nigeria isnt going to let the south go that easy.
PO29. We have all the oil. They know when they let us 
go they will have NOTHING.
PO30. Then they will realise their loss and misfortune. 
After decades of treating the south like nobodies they 
will realise they should have respected us and allowed 
us to worship freely.
PO31. Nigeria is supposed to me moving forward not 
backwards. The north can move backwards back to 500 
B.C. with their boko haram and sharia law nonsense.
PO32. While the south will take all its oil and put it to 
good use and move the country forward. i call the north 
DEAD WEIGHT.
As mentioned and demonstrated above, rhetorical 
questions appear to be one of the most frequently 
used engagement strategies in the forum. Whenever 
the few northern voices in the forum appear to take 
on an argument, they always do so by asking a ques-
tion, not necessarily expecting a clear answer, but to 
pull the interlocutor into some aspects of an ongoing 
argument as in PO33 below. The writer, most likely 
a Christian northerner, makes reference to Jesus 
Christ and argues that the north (perhaps northern 
Christians) can survive without oil if Nigeria breaks 
up. This interesting dimension of the argument is 
probably an aspect which many advocates of the 
breakup on the basis of religion have not deeply con-
sidered – the fact that not all northerners are Muslims. 
If Nigerian breaks up on account of the north ‘pro-
ducing nothing’ or that they are ‘Muslims’ and are 
‘violent’, what happens to northern (Hausa) 
Christians? What happens to southern Christians liv-
ing in the north? Some of the participants in the con-
versations appear to be completely ignorant of the 
complexity of the Nigerian ethnic problem, let alone 
problems associated with the economy and the dis-
tribution of wealth. That is why the construction of 
ethnic identity in the forum is highly ideological, 
most of the times, comprising mere emotional nega-
tive evaluations of the ‘other’.
PO33. What did we do to you? Is it only the northern 
states that benefit from oil wealth? Did we mismanage 
the oil wealth? Majority of us, 80% have nothing to do 
with oil money. We will survive with or without oil. 
Oil is not the necessity of life. If Jesus came to this 
world when it has no oil we shall still prosper with or 
without oil.
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PO34. @Ayo Olu2, Now cos of BOKO, y’all are 
calling for the disintergration of Nigeria, but Ojukwu 
did the same thing & all other tribes in Nigeria waged 
war & carried out POGROM on the Igbos, ‘the evil that 
men do, and History will vindicate, fill IN the rest. 
EVERYONE WILL TASTE THE BITTER PILL. 
Confuse nation & confuse people.
One of the few elements of engagement in the 
forum is appeal to shared knowledge. This positions 
the reader within some apparently common contex-
tual understandings with the writer. According to 
Hyland (2005), the notion of ‘sharedness’ is often 
invoked by writers to ‘smuggle’ some contested 
ideas into their argument, but in the context of the 
conversations on Nairaland, the writer refers to 
common history and calls to remembrance some 
familiar events in the past to buttress his or her argu-
ment. Sometimes, the reader can only agree with the 
writer by identifying with some common knowledge 
upon which the writer draws. In PO34, for example, 
the writer appeals to the common knowledge of the 
Nigerian civil war to engage those calling for the 
disintegration of Nigeria. The call for the breakup of 
Nigeria rekindles an anger in the writer, who is likely 
an Igbo and supporter of the Biafra campaign group 
(Chiluwa, 2012), against those who supported the 
war against the Igbo. Implicitly, the writer constructs 
Nigeria as a nation that lacks the understanding of 
what it really needs; thus, it has become a ‘confused 
nation’, with ‘confused people’. In other words, if 
other southern tribes had supported Ojukwu to 
achieve the Biafran revolution, the south would have 
been free from the north today. He or she further 
implies, therefore, that it is too late to seek disinte-
gration. As a matter of fact, the BH insurgency is 
viewed by indigenes of Igbo extraction as a just ret-
ribution against southerners for the death of over 
three millions Igbo people in the Nigerian civil war 
(see Chiluwa, 2012).
Conclusion
In conclusion, this article argues that the various 
negative evaluations of BH and their extension to the 
entire northern Nigeria is a dangerous development 
in the social and political discourse of Nairaland. 
The consistent constructions of northern Nigeria as 
‘violent people’ and Islam as an ‘evil’ religion is 
likely to further worsen religious and ethnic relations 
in Nigeria. Many of the participants in the forum fail 
to realise the religious composition of northern 
Nigeria, and the fact that a breakup of Nigeria is not 
likely to achieve the kind of Southern economic 
autonomy they anticipate. Also, they appear to mis-
understand the complexity of the process of disinte-
gration itself. Emotional evaluation of the ‘other’ in 
the conversations mostly reveal negative valence, 
that is, anger and hate against BH, Islam and north-
ern Nigeria. Elements of engagement in the conver-
sations have been mainly the use of the inclusive 
pronoun ‘we’ to construct the positive actions and 
attributes of Christians and southerners often con-
structed as the victim and ‘they’/‘them’ to construct 
BH, Muslims and northerners. Questions, mainly 
rhetorical, have been used to take stance and reveal 
the position of the writer; and an appeal to previous 
knowledge of the Nigerian civil war is basically used 
to pull the reader to the side of the argument pro-
posed by the writer.
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